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The emergence of biotechnology in crop and livestock applications has been an issue of great
controversy.  Proponents argue that the potential benefits are dramatic while opponents have raised many
concerns about the technology’s risks.  The Starlink debacle is a prime example of the undesirable
outcomes which the debate has created.  Given the controversy, what is the future of biotechnology for
food uses?  This paper is designed to address this question with a focus on the feasible range of
alternative futures (scenarios) that could emerge.  As a major variable in this analysis, the integrity of the
scientific and business communities plays a critically important role.
The paper begins with a description of three key uncertainties–food security, environmental/health
impacts, and consumer reaction–that will define the future for biotechnology’s use in food applications. 
Based on these uncertainties, four alternative future scenarios for biotechnology are presented.  The role
of messenger integrity is then introduced.  The integrity of various possible messengers (scientists,
businesses, government, and non-profits) is examined.  The concept of integrity is then used to address a
series of current biotechnology issues.  Throughout the paper, comparisons and contrasts between the
developed and developing world are made.
Fundamental Uncertainties about Biotechnology’s Future
The controversy over biotechnology is driven by a number of key uncertainties.  The first
uncertainty is whether the growing population of the world can be fed without the emergence of a new
“green revolution.”  Biotechnology has been argued to be this needed new technology.  Some population
growth projections would clearly argue that this new revolution is needed.  Even so, biotechnology may
or may not be the needed new technology.  However, the slowing of world population growth rates, the
emergence of expanding commodity supplies from developing countries, and the current glut of food
commodities worldwide would be counter arguments against this need.  Thus it is uncertain whether
biotechnology is needed to assure food security.
The second uncertainty is whether biotechnology results in net environmental and health benefits
or costs.  On the benefits side, biotechnology reduces reliance on agri-chemicals in the food chain and
holds open the promise of new beneficial health attributes being engineered into food, e.g., golden rice. 
On the cost side are the concerns over superweeds, superbugs, loss of beneficial insects or plants,
terminator technology, allergic reactions, loss of nutrition, and other unintended environmental and health2
consequences of a new technology.  The argument has been advanced by some that these costs have been
overestimated and that “good science” can prove this.  Again, it is unclear whether biotechnology will
bring about net gains to the environment or human health.
The third uncertainty relevant to the future of biotechnology is the public/consumer reaction to
the technology.  Irrespective of how the first two uncertainties are resolved (and in reality they will
almost assuredly not be resolved perfectly in one direction or the other), the reaction of the public will
have a major impact.  This has already proven to be true.  There will likely be perceived differences
across the public about the costs and benefits related to either food security or environmental/health
impacts.  As a result, one part of this uncertainty is whether individuals in a market setting will be allowed
to respond individually or instead governments will respond en masse on behalf of the public in the form
of broad regulation.  Another part of this uncertainty is whether the consumers of the developed versus
developing worlds may respond differently in how benefits and costs are assessed and traded off. 
Biotechnology may or may not win in the court of public opinion and thus substantial business risk arises
for agribusiness firms.
By their very nature, these three uncertainties can not be resolved in the short-run.  Only the
emerging actual changes in population, biotechnology impacts on environment and health, and
public/consumer reaction can resolve the uncertainties.  Unfortunately, decision makers both private and
public must make decisions today about whether to continue, expand, or abandon investments in the
technology.  Without such decisions, the technology may not be available if needed and may not be
appropriately managed to mitigate adverse impacts if they emerge.
Four Scenarios for Biotechnology’s Future
Based on the techniques of scenario analysis (Schonemaker), four possible futures could emerge
based on these uncertainties:
Scenario 1: Biotechnology is banned, either formally or informally.  The most direct road to
this scenario is that the food security needs do not emerge, but the adverse environmental/health
impacts do.  The public reaction will be clear and negative in this case, either individually or en
masse.  A less direct road to this scenario could also emerge.  The perceived adverse impacts of
biotechnology come to be viewed by the public as a set of risks that are not seen as outweighed
by any level of potential benefits.  Biotechnology may thus be banned formally by government or
informally by consumer choice in the marketplace.  The U.S. nuclear experience provides
evidence of this less direct path.  Although no formal ban exists, public reaction has in effect lead
to no new nuclear power facilities being built in the last 20 years.
Scenario 2: Biotechnology becomes fully accepted in the marketplace.  Consumer-oriented
biotechnology products become available, and biotechnology follows the pattern of other past
agri-food innovations.  Again, there are both direct and indirect paths to this scenario.  The direct
path is that the food security needs do emerge, and biotechnology proves to be safe in meeting
these needs.  The public reaction will be clear and positive in this case, either individually or en
masse.  The indirect path is that the food security need emerges, safety protocols (public and/or
private) are developed to allay public concerns, and biotechnology emerges in the court of public
opinion as the safest of available alternatives.  Either path would result in biotechnology ultimately3
becoming fully accepted even though the indirect path would have a longer period of controversy
before consensus emerged.
Scenario 3: The food system adopts a “three labels” approach to biotechnology.  Given the
nature of the food security and environmental/health uncertainties, a solution that may evolve and
has been adopted by some already, e.g., Japan, is to label all food by its method of
production–conventional, biotechnology, and organic.  Individual consumers thus choose in the
marketplace based on their individual weighing of the risks and benefits.  The public reaction is
thus allowed to be resolved on an individual basis rather than en masse.
Scenario 4: Biotechnology is used only in non-food applications.  Consumers are unwilling to
have biotechnology used in food, but would allow commercial or industrial applications, e.g.,
pharmaceuticals, replacement of industrial chemicals with biologically based alternatives.  Based
on the recent StarLink experience and other needs to allay public concerns, a system of careful
control of biotechnology crops and livestock emerges. Such agricultural products are produced in
environmentally-controlled, manufacturing-like facilities.  Strict system segregation from food
uses is maintained to the public’s satisfaction.
The scenario analysis suggests that the third uncertainty–consumer reaction–is critical to determine the
future scenarios.  The first two uncertainties will only be resolved over an extended time while the third
one can be and is already being played out in the near term.
Modeling the Role of Integrity
The resolution of the third uncertainty–public/consumer reaction–depends on the integrity of the
information that the consumer has for decision making.  In essence, the consumer is faced with a classic
information problem akin to the market for lemons (Akerlof).  The consumer is being asked to purchase a
product whose attributes can not be known at the time of purchase, i.e., the true costs and benefits of
biotechnology.  The consumer must thus fear opportunism on the part of the seller, i.e., the life sciences
industry, who is presumed to have superior private information.  The seller has incentives to hide
information if it is adverse to the buyer’s interests and to share it if in concert with the buyer’s interests. 
However, the buyer can not know a priori which is true of the information-sharing practices of the seller. 
The history of the tobacco industry is a case well established in the minds of the consumers as a perfect
example of this information problem.
The problem for the consumer is further complicated by the fact that there are many potential
“sellers” of information about biotechnology.  Governments, environmental groups, and food industry
firms outside the biotechnology industry also have interests in consumers’ decisions about this issue.  The
consumer must gauge the integrity of each of these information sources.  There is also one additional
source of information critical to this situation–the profession of science.  The so-called “good science”
argument is an ultimate appeal to consumers that science provides a source of information that can be
inherently trusted on matters such as biotechnology.
The critical question relevant to public/consumer reaction becomes: Who has the integrity to
interpret the risks and benefits of biotechnology to the general public and the food consumer?  Given the
information problem posited, the integrity of the messenger will be a key driver of the acceptance or lack4
of acceptance of biotechnology and thus of the future scenario that emerges.  A messenger with high
integrity would be expected to give information about biotechnology that is true, complete, and not based
on opportunism.  Low integrity would result in a message that is in whole or in part untrue, incomplete,
or based on opportunism.  There would also be perceived gradations of information quality and thus
integrity in between these two extremes.  
In this context, the public/consumer assessment of messenger integrity can be conceived of as
arising from three interrelated factors: a messenger’s underlying motives, a messenger’s organizational
form (or affiliation), and other signals of integrity based on real behavior consistent or inconsistent with
integrity.  First, underlying motives are critical to whether a particular messenger will likely behave
opportunistically.  The greater the likelihood that a given messenger’s interests will diverge from the
interests of consumers, the greater the perceived likelihood that the messenger will not behave with
integrity.  Second, within the information economics literature, signaling is an important means for an
economic actor with private information to adopt behavior that properly interpreted reveals the relevant
private information (Milgrom and Roberts).  One particularly important signal of motives is the
institutional form or affiliation of the messenger.  Institutional form is a relatively permanent decision
about why and how to operate.  It is thus evidence of a credible (as opposed to transitory) commitment
to a given set of motives. The profession of science, government, business, and non-profit organization
are each potentially powerful signals about underlying motives.  Finally, a whole array of real behaviors
on the part of messengers can signal real integrity or its absence.
Starting with the first two factors, motives and institutional form, a matrix of possible messengers
about biotechnology can be formed (Table 1).  The assessments found in the cells are an expression of
likely a priori consumer/public perceptions of the link between motive and form for the indicated
messengers.  For example, governments are presumed to behave out of public motives, e.g., contributing
to knowledge, monitoring behavior, and promoting social good.  They are not expected to behave out of
a profit motive.  The public would a priori assume high messenger integrity for government messengers. 
On the other hand, private business is expected to behave out of a profit motive, and thus public
perceptions of a business messenger’s integrity are a priori low on topics such as biotechnology because
the risk of opportunism is perceived as high.  Like government, non-profits are also accorded an a priori
assumption of high integrity because they do not pursue profit by definition.  Finally, the profession of
science has historically been accorded the presumption of high integrity because of is members’ loyalty to
the scientific principles of objectivity and thoroughness of analysis.   
Unfortunately, for the public and for consumers, the real integrity of a messenger may not reflect
the presumptions recorded in most of the cells of Table 1.  The profession of science provides an
interesting case in point.  Historically, the purest expression of this institution would have been the
university scientist whose sole presumed motive would have been contribution to  knowledge.  Academic
freedom has always been about maintaining the independence and objectivity of scientists to pursue
knowledge without the complications of other motives.  As5
Table 1: Public/Consumer Presumptions of Messenger Motive and Form Linkages
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discussion has emerged recently over such concerns as the “kept university” (Press and Washburn) and
academic generation of patents in support of personal and university revenue generation, the university
scientist’s motives have come increasingly under scrutiny by the public.  A university scientist’s real
behavior in pursuit of revenue and personal profit may thus move such a scientist into the profit motive
column of Table 1 with an accompanying decline in public/consumer perception of messenger integrity. 
The presence of other types of scientists across this row of the matrix raises a particularly perplexing
question: Is the scientist loyal to the profession or to the employer?  Public perceptions (the ones most
relevant to the third uncertainty) likely view the scientist aligning with the employer rather than with the
profession, whether or not this is in fact the case.  The integrity of a scientist as a messenger is thus
judged through the screen of who the scientist works for, and university scientists are not necessarily seen
as having pure knowledge-based motives.
The real behavior of other messengers can also compromise the public/consumer perceptions of
integrity.  Government administrations or legislatures can act out of narrow political motives as opposed
to the social good.  The extent to which non-profits engage heavily in public advocacy of narrowly
focused causes may cause them to lose the public’s presumption of integrity.  Advocacy raises that
concern that such groups may be engaged in revenue enhancing motives to sustain their ability to
advocate.  The presumption of a given messenger’s integrity will also vary by region of the world. 
Various messengers have had very different histories depending upon region or even country.  In some
areas, private industry may be viewed as having more integrity than governmental leaders.6
Signals of real integrity (the third factor in public/consumer assessments of integrity) are thus
critically important.  Consumers will heavily consider the real behavior or “track record” of any
messenger in regard to exhibiting integrity.  Although the examples sited previous have shown how real
behavior undermines presumptions of integrity, signals of real integrity can either:
 (1) reinforce the perceived integrity of the messenger, e.g., a scientist exhibits detached
objectivity with testing a claim or new technology, or 
(2) counteract perceived integrity either
(a) positively, e.g., a life science company openly accepts a third party review, or
(b) negatively, e.g., a university scientist does exclusive research for a private life
science firm that promises patent royalties in return.
There are a whole host of real signals that will either enhance or detract from a messenger’s real
integrity in the eyes of the public.  Table 2 provides a representative, not exhaustive, list of these signals. 
Any behavior that communicates mutual interest with the consumer will reinforce integrity while any
behavior that communicates a conflict of interest will reinforce a lack of integrity.  Those situations in
which a messenger would be perceived to be under pressure to abandon integrity are particularly salient
to the public’s judgement about integrity.  For example, a university scientist speaks out against a private
firm’s message when the firm is a major donor to the university.  Or, a firm’s own scientist whistle blows
about weak or absent testing procedures.  In either case, the scientist signals real alignment with the
motive of knowledge-contribution and thus enhances his/her integrity as a messenger.  Successful
messengers, either for or against biotechnology, will need in the final analysis to exhibit real integrity.
Table 2: Signals Consistent and Inconsistent with Real Integrity
Signals Consistent with Real Integrity Signals Inconsistent with Real Integrity
• reputation for objectivity
• tolerance of open, honest debate
• acceptance of neutral review
• reputation for promoting/protecting the
“public good”
• avoiding crusading/attack mentality
• avoiding exaggerated promotional claims
• any other behavior that communicates
mutual interest with the public
• reputation for narrow interests
• avoidance/opposition to open debate
• unwillingness to have neutral review
• reputation for aggressive pursuit of profit
without regard to other motives
• exhibiting crusading/attack mentality
• engaging in exaggerated promotional
claims
• any other behavior that communicates
conflicting interest with the public
Applying the Concept of Messenger Integrity to the Evolving Issues of Biotechnology
The concept of messenger integrity can be applied in a number of ways to explain recent public
reactions to biotechnology and to predict future reactions to strategies currently and potentially open to
messengers.  These applications will show that the future scenario that emerges for biotechnology will
depend on the integrity of the messengers that emerge.2Hill and Battle provide a useful analysis of the EU-US GMO debate.
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Consider first the likely differences in the scenarios that may emerge for North America versus
Europe.
2  In North American, the probability that either Scenario 2 (full acceptance) or Scenario 3
(consumer choice through labeling) will emerge is high.  The US has a long history of successful agri-
food system monitors with high levels of both perceived and real integrity, e.g., USDA, FDA, EPA, and
university scientists.  The USDA, FDA, and EPA have given approvals to biotechnology.  Canada, much
more than Mexico, has a similar system of monitors to the US, and both Canada and Mexico closely
follow the lead of the US on these types of issues.   
The probability of biotechnology playing a major role in the future of the EU is much lower than
in North America.  Scenarios 1 (banning of biotechnology) or 4 (limited use to non-food applications) are
far more likely to emerge.  The EU’s government monitors have lost perceived (if not real) integrity
recently due to the way they handled the outbreaks of mad cow disease and foot-and-mouth disease.  The
highly promotional manner in which biotechnology was introduced in Europe by the life sciences
companies also limited their perceived integrity.  It appears that the European public perceives the NGOs
as the integrity leaders concerning the science of biotechnology.  The supporting evidence is that most
EU NGOs are anti-biotechnology.  In addition to raiding GMO fields and protesting, these organizations
appear to have influenced policy which has limited the consumption and production of biotech products
in the EU.  Unless risks are reduced and products are put in the market channel that address consumer
benefits (cure diseases, bio factories with positive environmental impacts, etc.), the prospect of
biotechnology products being successful in the EU is low.  The other option is that the governing bodies
of the EU food system regain their influence through improved acts consistent with real integrity and
decide that biotechnology is critical for the future. 
As a second case, consider the differences of reaction across the developing world.  The future of
biotechnology is extremely complex in developing countries.  The economies of many of these nations are
dependent on the US, EU or Japan.  Therefore, the integrity of local messengers may be mitigated or
enhanced by the influence of the final market for the product.  In sub-Saharan Africa where many nations
have historic trading ties with the EU, the integrity leader in most of these countries is the government
who would like to reduce their malnutrition rates and increase income from agricultural trade.  Such
leaders are torn between the potential benefits of biotechnology and the demands of products moving
from home markets to the EU.  The messages remain mixed as to what to do with the technology.  NGOs
are intricately involved in these nations and have some influence as well.  However, the government can
simply remove an NGO that counters its policy.  Thus far, only South Africa and Kenya have ongoing
trials of biotech products in sub-Saharan Africa.  The integrity that arises from this process will likely be
high for these governments given the consistency of trials with real integrity.  Any of the four scenarios
for biotechnology could thus emerge in sub-Saharan Africa given the mixed messages and mixed levels of
messenger integrity that exist there.
Predicting the scenarios for the developing world is further complicated by the existence of a
centrally-planned economy where government is the sole voice whether it has integrity or not on the
biotechnology issue.   China is a good example where the government has decided that biotechnology is
the key to feeding their population.  Consumer choice to avoid biotechnology products may not exist in
this system.  Scenarios 2 (full acceptance) is created by fiat, but may unravel to Scenarios 1 (banning the8
technology) or 4 (limiting to non-food uses) if subsequent events prove the liabilities rather than the
benefits of the technology.  In any event, the surprising result is that Chinese consumers are in effect
facing the same situation as North American consumers currently, neither can predetermine the presence
of biotechnology in their food and thus neither has real choice.  North American consumers do have the
ability to create Scenario 3 (private choice through labeling) while the Chinese consumers are not likely
to have this choice.
A third sub-case for the developing world exists and has the highest probability in the poorest of
the poor countries.  In this system there are several key breakdowns in society that may lead to business
representatives being the integrity leader.  These key breakdowns include one or more of the following:
dysfunctional governments, extremely high food security risk, a fragile environment, and/or abundant
health risk.  The perceived risks of biotechnology may be lower than the real risks from these
breakdowns.  A biotechnology company could provide great opportunities to farmers, traders and the
rural community.  An anecdotal example of this comes from South Africa which does not represent the
poorest of the poor as a country, however, it is a nation best described as both first and third world. 
Monsanto created a pilot program (subsidized the cost of buying the seed) for resource poor farmers so
that they would try Monsanto’s BT Cotton (Brink).  These farmers were reported to have increased their
annual profits by $150 on average.  Integrity becomes driven by real benefits in the face of very high risk. 
If this example is expanded to a truly destitute country, it is a possibility that a private business, e.g.,
Monsanto, could become the perceived and real messenger of integrity.  Presently, most biotechnology
firms do not see ample returns on their investment and thus bypass these nations. 
Moving beyond differences in the scenarios by country, the concept of messenger integrity can
give guidance to individual messengers interested to promoting one of the scenarios over others.  In
general, efforts by Monsanto and the other biotechnology companies to promote biotechnology are likely
to have relatively little influence on which scenario emerges in the industrialized world because they lack
perceived integrity (due to the narrowness of profit motives) and they often fail to signal real integrity
(e.g., highly promotional advertizing on the benefits and risks of biotechnology).  Receptiveness to
neutral review by third parties and investment in systems that promote consumer choice would be more
likely to promote their perceived and real integrity and thus their influence on which scenario emerges.
The integrity concepts described in this paper can be applied to two other issues of note.  First,
arguments have been advanced that the development of consumer benefits from biotechnology (as
opposed to the agronomic benefits created to date) will in and of itself create consumer acceptance.  In
effect, this is an argument that messenger integrity will not be important because the consumer will forget
the potential costs and risks in the face of enhanced benefits.  Now that the public and food consumers
are aware of the integrity issues related to biotechnology, it is not very likely that the emergence of new
benefits will eliminate the controversy.  The balance of benefits and costs may improve in favor of
benefits, but consumers will remain skeptical.  For the consumers of the industrialized world most
especially, the new benefits may have to be extremely valuable to counterbalance the uneasiness over
potential risks.
Second, the concept of messenger integrity shows the “good science” argument to be a weak (if
not entire useless) one for the public generally or for food consumers specifically.  The “good science”
argument is not compelling because the presumed integrity of the scientist as messenger depends upon
whom the scientist represents rather than on some presumed loyalty to the scientific method and its9
objectivity.  Even in the case of university scientists, mixed signals of real integrity (pursuit of royalties
vs. knowledge) can negate the integrity historically presumed.  A call to allow “good science” to prevail
in the controversy over biotechnology is not in itself a signal of real integrity.  It may have become just
the opposite.
Summary and Conclusion
Three key uncertainties–the real need for biotechnology to assure food security, biotechnology’s
real balance of benefits and costs, and public/consumer acceptance of the technology–give rise to four
scenarios for biotechnology’s future.  The technology may be formally or informally banned (Scenario 1),
become fully accepted (Scenario 2), move to market through strict labeling (Scenario 3), or limited to
non-food applications (Scenario 4).  Because of the critical role that public/consumer acceptance will
have, the integrity of messengers about biotechnology will have a pivotal influence on the scenario that
finally emerges.  Messenger integrity is itself a highly complex issues.  Integrity hinges on messenger
motives, institutional form, and a wide array of possible signals that enhance or detract from the public’s
assessment of integrity.  Assessments of real integrity were shown to vary not just by institutional form
but also by region of the world with the most complex set of possibilities arising in the developing
nations.
Agribusiness messengers from the biotechnology industry have some special liabilities when it
comes to perceived and real messenger integrity.  For these messengers to influence the biotechnology
scenario that emerges, they will have to rely more on sending signals consistent with real integrity (e.g.,
neutral review, promotion of open and complete debate) and less on signals inconsistent with real
integrity (e.g., narrow promotional appeals).10
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